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Abstract  
This article argues that students of retail history need to give more attention to the 
idea of the retail format. Employing a conceptualisation of the format recently 
presented in contemporary retail studies, it reveals the importance of so-called 
“offering” and “know-how” components to a fuller understanding of the development 
of the supermarket format in post-war Britain. Supermarket development is shown to 
be affected by, and itself impact on, a complex interplay of factors. Arguments 
presented in the article are supported by a detailed examination of supermarket 
development at the London Co-operative Society between 1960 and 1965. The paper 
thus also contributes to our knowledge of the history of co-operative retailing in the 
post-war period.    
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Introduction 
Insufficient attention is given to the concept of the retail format and to the insights 
that it can offer to the study of retail history. The term “format” is frequently used in a 
simple manner in order to identify the broad retail store type of interest. Only 
occasionally are definitions of particular formats contested, perhaps most notable 
being the case of the department store.1 One implication of this lack of attention is 
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that variations within broad format types are inadequately addressed. Consequently, 
we know insufficient detail about the development and management of formats by 
particular retail firms. Another is that the impact of format change for wider, inter-
firm relations and processes, such as those occurring in the supply chain, are 
overlooked. This study provides a detailed evaluation of one retailer’s development of 
the supermarket format. It does so not in an attempt to identify the first or purest form 
of the format.2 Instead the paper argues that one characteristic of early supermarket 
retailing was its diversity. The analysis is based upon a detailed reading of the archive 
of the London Co-operative Society (hereafter LCS) supported by a review of the 
trade and popular press. The paper draws upon discussions in the literature of 
contemporary retail management as well as those in retail history.  
In addition to highlighting the case for more attention to be given to the 
concept of the format, the paper also contributes more broadly to our understanding of 
co-operative society retailing during the post-war period (in this case roughly 1960-
1965). Recent historical research has explored general trends in early supermarket 
adoption in the co-operative movement.3 The analysis of format development at the 
society level represents a valuable addition to this, revealing as it does key retail 
management issues at the local, trading level. It provides an opportunity for more 
meaningful firm-level comparisons. By concentrating on events during the period 
1960 to 1965 the paper explores the adoption of supermarket format innovation at a 
time when its significance had become generally established. It provides a useful 
contrast to studies that concentrate on the emergence of these innovations.4 
 The LCS was formed and developed through the amalgamation of a number of 
London and regional co-operative societies extending its area of influence beyond the 
capital into Middlesex, Essex, Hertfordshire and Surrey.5 It became the largest of the 
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UK co-operative societies with a membership of 1.25 million people.6 The archive, 
held at the Bishopsgate Institute, London, holds a large collection of material covering 
the range of the society’s activities, including political and educational aspects as well 
as those of retail trading. It is the latter that is the focus here, although care is taken to 
avoid artificially separating the retail business of the society from its wider 
organisational underpinnings as the latter also inform our understanding. That part of 
the LCS archive related to the retail trades is itself considerable in scope. It includes 
numerous minute books and papers from the management committee and sub-
committees across the range of the society’s retail trade including chemists and 
department stores as well as the food trades that are the focus here. Management of 
the LCS’s retail operations was based upon a structure of an elected management 
committee (or board), supporting management subcommittees and a professional 
management executive. Of the subcommittees “Number 2” is of most interest in this 
study, its remit including the society’s food trades. The study focuses largely on the 
period 1960-1965. The starting date is broadly co-incident with the emergence of 
supermarket development activities at the LCS. By 1965 the LCS was trading from 
three purpose-developed supermarkets, and the first signs of their profitability were 
being recorded its financial analyses.  
The remainder of the paper is structured into four sections. In the next section 
the notion of the retail format is discussed and related to debates surrounding the 
growth of supermarket retailing in Britain. Following this, the paper provides a brief 
review of the development of self-service retailing and the supermarket format by the 
LCS. The main section of the paper assesses the society’s deliberations over and 
engagement with key aspects of the supermarket format. Discussion is organised 
around so-called “offering” and “know-how” format characteristics of the 
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supermarket. The paper ends by highlighting the key conclusions drawn from the LCS 
case. 
 
 
The supermarket as a retail format 
 
Retail formats are complex combinations of visible and hidden components. This 
helps to explain why it can be difficult for the outside observer to identify new retail 
formats with precision, develop clear definitions of even the main types and gain 
consensus for these definitions.  This is certainly the case for supermarkets which 
emerged in Britain during the 1950s. A basic trade definition of the supermarket was 
in circulation by the early 1960s that considered ‘a supermarket is a store of not less 
than 2, 000 sq. ft. sales area, with three or more checkouts and operated mainly on 
self-service, whose range of merchandise comprises all food groups, including fresh 
meat and fresh fruit and vegetables, plus basic household requisites (i.e. soaps and 
cleaning materials).’7 However, in the earliest post-war years of self-service retailing 
what constituted a supermarket was less clearly articulated even among interested 
parties. One reason is because much early self-service retailing and shopping took 
place through converted grocery outlets of varied size and make up; many being far 
smaller and carrying a much narrower product assortment than what eventually came 
to be recognised as supermarkets. Comparisons with supermarket retailing in the US 
also led to ambiguities.8 The typical supermarket of 1950s America was some 18 000 
square feet (1620 m2) in size, with the largest stocking in excess of 10 000 articles.9 
The first supermarkets developed in Britain were much smaller in size, a fact reflected 
in the 2 000 sq. ft. minimum sales area adopted as a benchmark in early attempts to 
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define the format. As late as 1967 it was suggested that the typical supermarket in 
Britain was only some 4 000 sq. ft. in size.10  
Trade definitions such as the one presented above consider only those 
components of a format that are visible at the outlet, in this case store size, shopping 
environment and service type and product assortment. No attention is given to more 
hidden factors or to those which occur away from the outlet, such as the systems 
supporting the stores and the operating firm’s organisational structure and 
management culture. This is problematic because the nature of firms’ format 
variations, and their success or otherwise in operating formats, are also influenced by 
such systems, structures and cultures.  
Lewison highlights the importance of the format to retail competition: 
‘Competitive advantages are realized by creating a retail format that is tailored to 
specific needs of a carefully determined segment of the total market. Retail formats 
(the means) encompass the total mix of operating and merchandising tactics and 
practices used by the retail firm to distinguish and differentiate itself from other 
competing retail formats.’11 Formats can be seen as ‘combinations of technologies’ 
and retailing involves the bundling of these technologies in ways considered most 
appropriate for the marketplace.12 Viewing them in this way can help us to understand 
format variation. In a more detailed consideration of the nature of the format, 
Goldman views it as consisting of two parts: the offering (external) and the know-how 
(internal).13 The first includes elements such as product assortment, shopping 
environment, service, location and price. The second part, the know-how, he 
considers to determine a retailer's operational strength and strategic direction. It 
consists of the retail technology dimension (the systems, methods, procedures and 
techniques the retailer uses) and the retail culture (including the repertoire of 
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concepts, norms, rules, practices and experiences).14 In contrast to some recent 
interpretations that have restricted attention to the elements visible to the consumer, 
this paper adopts Goldman’s fuller conceptualisation.15 
In doing so it is possible to differentiate better and to account for variations 
within as well as between broad format types. Hence the various supermarket type 
formats appearing can be better understood, avoiding their development being too 
simply characterised as that of one homogenous form. This is important as a close 
reading of the history of self-service retailing in post-war Britain reveals the very 
different offers put before the consumer.16  
 
 
The LCS and the “modernization” of retailing  
 
Recent studies have contributed to our understanding of the development of self-
service retailing and supermarket outlets in post-war Britain and their impact on 
consumer practices.17 The innovative role of the co-operative movement is revealed, 
with the LCS’s experimental conversion of its Romford grocery branch to self-service 
in 1942 widely remarked upon.18 By 1950 there were some 50 or so supermarkets 
operating in Britain, and the co-operative movement was at the vanguard of their 
development.19 Yet by 1961, when the number of supermarkets had swollen to an 
estimated 572,20 the dominance of the co-operative movement was being eroded by 
the private multiples.21 Less attention has been given to the co-operative’s place in 
this latter phase of supermarket development.  
Between 1957 and 1961 the co-operative movement suffered a 1 per cent 
decline in its share of total retail trade. The private multiples had increased their share 
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of the food trades market in particular.22 At a time of reduced margins the need for co-
operative societies to more rapidly adopt the supermarket was very clear. Supermarket 
development could help to lower labour costs and to increase profits by means of 
higher turnover. They could also provide the superior outputs that consumers were 
quickly becoming accustomed to. The complexities and challenges such adoption 
posed were also clear. These included obtaining the finance necessary to acquire 
appropriate sites and develop the new larger stores, finding and training appropriate 
staff at both the management and operational levels at a time of general labour 
shortage and employing the retail management approaches required for successful 
supermarket trading. In a letter to co-operative societies from the Co-operative Union, 
the National Executive of the Co-operative Grocery Trade Association and 
Development Committee made clear their advice that, wherever practicable, societies 
should adopt the new low cost techniques of food retailing. It stressed ‘A supermarket 
is not only a building, but a machine for selling goods. It must be properly operated if 
the best results are to be obtained. Price structures and practices based on smaller 
shops are often wrong for supermarkets.’23 
Despite its considerable size, the LCS was a society in trading difficulties by 
the late 1950s and was portrayed as epitomising an increasing malaise in co-operative 
retailing as a whole. When the newspaper The People launched its wide-ranging 
attack on co-operative retailing entitled “The Dying Giant in Your High Street” it paid 
particular attention to the performance of the LCS. It reported that the society had 
suffered a decline in food sales despite British consumers’ food expenditure rising by 
10 per cent overall between 1957 and 1960. Furthering its attack, the paper used the 
society’s West Ealing grocery branch to undertake a basket price comparison with a 
nearby private multiple. Claiming a significant saving available at the latter it 
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suggested that the co-operative lacked the variety of bargains that the multiple could 
offer.24 The co-operatives response to The People article rehearsed arguments of 
propagandist attacks on democratic socialists and sought to rebut many of the claims 
made.25 However the movement knew that overall there was much to be done. After 
all, less than four years previously the Co-operative Independent Commission had 
voiced concern that ‘if we ask what is the “image” of a Co-operative shop in the 
public mind, the answer will not be a supermarket or a new department store.’26 In the 
case of the LCS the stiff retail competition provided by the grocery multiples’ 
supermarkets in London and the need for rapid modernisation across its food retail 
store network was beyond denial. It became one focus of an increasingly bitter 
struggle for the overall control of the LCS.27 One protagonist in the struggle, future 
society President John Stonehouse28 remarked on the need to modernise the society’s 
food store network in 1961, ‘We have lost time and we have lost the dynamic… If we 
are content to merely allow our organisation to tick over as it has been doing, we shall 
find ourselves well and truly outstripped within the next decade.’29  
The fall in the LCS’s food trades market share during the last years of the 
1950s and the early years of the 1960s mirrored in trend, if surpassed in extent, a 
general decline in the co-operative movement’s share of the retail food trades. 
Turnover in the LCS’s grocery department had declined sharply from £16m in 1957 to 
14.7m by 1960 and further to 13.5m by 1962.30 Falling LCS turnover came at a time 
when typical grocery margins were under increased pressure from new high turnover, 
low margin ways of selling employed by the supermarket operators. A large network 
of counter-service grocery outlets meant that the LCS endured higher labour costs 
than many of its competitors. Raised margins set by the society to meet these costs 
were increasingly untenable. The advertising agency giant Batten, Barton, Durstine & 
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Osborn (hereafter BBDO), hired by the LCS during the early 1960s, produced a 
controversial report on the society’s progress in 1961 concluding that the society was 
facing labour costs that would prove ruinous unless it set out on a development 
strategy based upon larger retail units and their benefits of new self-service techniques 
and improved productivity.31 Net profit in the LCS’s grocery department fell from 
£661 292 in 1960 to £27 065 in 1962.32 The society’s dividend, which had been 9d in 
1957, fell to 4d during 1961. 
Despite its early experimentation with self-service, the LCS faced clear 
challenges in converting its large counter-service grocery outlet infrastructure to self-
service methods. Far more considerable difficulties came in attempts to adopt 
supermarket retailing. By 1960 there were only 62 self-service stores and 19 food 
halls from a total of 409 grocery stores across the society.33 By 1961 the number of 
self-service stores in the society’s portfolio had grown to 120 with an additional 24 of 
the larger self-service food halls.34 These store numbers meant that the LCS had more 
self-service stores than many other large co-operative societies, such as the Royal 
Arsenal and Birmingham societies, yet they represented a much lower proportion of 
the overall store network.35 Similarly, the LCS was not too dissimilar in terms of total 
number of stores operating on self-service basis to its private multiple rivals Victor 
Value (191) and Tesco (211), but again these competitors had far fewer counter-
service stores.36 It was somewhat belatedly in 1961 that the society set down a more 
comprehensive programme for self-service retailing. Importantly this included 
discussions of plans for nine proposed supermarket development schemes.37 By this 
date rivals such as Premier (Express Dairy), Fine Fare and Victor Value among others 
had already established supermarkets in the LCS trading area.   
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Supermarket development was one focus of each of the main groups of 
protagonists for election to the LCS management executive in 1962. The election 
statement of the controlling London Co-operative Members’ Organisation (hereafter 
LCMO) group announced that they sought to double overall retail trade within ten 
years, whilst also stressing the need to improve working conditions for the society’s 
employees. Key to the revitalisation of the grocery trade was plans to convert all 
remaining grocery shops to self-service and to re-group existing food outlets into 
more comprehensive food halls wherever possible. Most significantly, there was to be 
an accelerated supermarket development plan with existing supermarket 
developments to be completed and complemented by a further fifty such stores.38  
The ultimately successful 1960 Campaign Committee put forward its case for 
election of its members to the management committee based around a retail trades 
plan very broadly similar to the LCMO’s in that it included a two-prong strategy of 
improving staff conditions and modernising the retail infrastructure. Supermarket 
development was again central, although the 1960 Campaign Committee declined to 
put a precise figure on store numbers going forward. At the same time it challenged 
the ruling LCMO over factory closures and the closing of ‘uneconomic’ shops. Under 
headings such as ‘Competition must be met’, ‘New look for our Stores’ and ‘Modern 
methods are a “must”’ the Campaign Committee’s election pamphlet launched a 
strong attack on the managing LCMO, accusing it of overseeing many years of costly 
delay in the modernisation of the society’s shops and stores.39 Pressure was required, 
it argued, to ensure that the controlling group’s recently announced and ambitious 
development programme was carried out. The Campaign Committee stressed its 
credentials to manage any such modernisation by arguing the need for new stores to 
be supported by modern buying procedures and store operations. In short, one of the 
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key aims of the committee was, it stated, ‘to build up the public image of the Society 
as go-ahead and highly efficient.’ 40 
 
 
‘Offering’ (external) elements of the supermarket format 
 
This section of the paper considers the offering (external) elements of the supermarket 
format. The next section considers the know-how (internal) elements. In combination 
they comprise the main components of the retail format as noted by Goldman.41 The 
path to adoption of the supermarket format by the LCS and the extensive management 
deliberations that accompanied this are considered with reference to this 
conceptualisation. So too are the particular characteristics of the society’s supermarket 
units and the operations employed therein. Use of this fuller conceptualisation enables 
us to make sense of the developments occurring and to distinguish within the broad 
format type of the supermarket. In particular it enables us to identify and distinguish 
between the society’s prototypical large format self-service retailing in the food halls 
and the movement to purpose-developed supermarkets. In reality the internal and 
external components of the format are inter-mixed of course. However, for purposes 
of clarity and illustration the various elements that make up the format are considered 
separately here.      
The first offering element for consideration is “Location”. Supermarket 
developments during the study period were typically located in or close to town centre 
locations and loci of suburban shoppers. Dealing with external considerations such as 
town planning restrictions could slow development, as in the case of the LCS’s 
Loughton supermarket.42 Acquiring much-sought-after shop sites on or near to the 
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rapidly emerging municipal housing developments was also a challenge, although in 
the case of the London County Council area at least the co-operative was given 
reasonable access to new sites.43 The society’s existing infrastructure of smaller 
grocery, butcher’s and fruit and vegetable shops in many ways represented a 
hindrance to the modernisation of the food trades through supermarket operations. 
First, many were too small for conversion to supermarket formats containing a range 
of non-food as well as food items, or even to larger self-service food retailing through 
food halls.44 Second, as discussed below, others were in locations considered 
unsuitable for redevelopment with such formats.45 As a consequence the society faced 
potentially significant exit sunk costs in seeking to dispose of their small counter-
service units and adopt new trading methods in larger supermarket outlets. Faced with 
market rental costs described by the society’s grocery department manager as being 
‘terrificly high’,46 financing the acquisition of new sites suitable for supermarket 
development was difficult. So too was meeting the cost of redeveloping existing sites 
for supermarket trading. Thanks to its extensive property portfolio the society could 
point to an advantage over some of the less well capitalised rivals emerging in the 
market,47 but like the movement as whole it was bound by its practice of distributing 
capital surplus, particularly though the dividend. As Sparks notes in his review of 
post-war consumer co-operation, the result of this approach has been that ‘in a 
situation where locations have changed, and the price of developing retail outlets has 
… rocketed, many societies have found themselves under capitalised.’48 The LCS was 
no different in this regard.49 Perhaps unsurprisingly the LCS’s first supermarket was 
developed on a site converted from use as a small drapery store.50 
One upshot of the society’s existing infrastructure of smaller shops across the 
food trades was the attempt, where conditions permitted, to physically combine two or 
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more adjacent shops into new larger self-service food halls. Whilst not initially 
carrying much in the way of non-food, these halls provided an extended array of food 
goods in a larger, more attractive self-service store environment. The LCS had 24 
such food halls by 1961 and placed emphasis on them in their store development 
plans of the early 1960s. By 1965 it had 6 halls that it considered in size and turnover 
to be essentially similar to a supermarket.51 Further discussion on the society’s 
development of the food hall format is provided below. 
When the LCS did eventually embark on developing supermarkets in the early 
1960s, like other retailers it faced challenges in gaining the necessary management 
expertise to ensure efficient store location research and assessment. In their review of 
this aspect of LCS operations BBDO concluded that, overall, the processes of store 
research and development were ‘amateur and old fashioned’ and that ‘too many of 
your stores are in the wrong places, too many of your new stores and conversions are 
not good enough and too much money is locked up in unproductive real estate.’52 
According to BBDO, what was needed was a new store research and development 
unit along the lines of those run by the private multiples and utilising the services of 
outside professionals such as architects, supermarket planners and property 
developers.53  
The development of the LCS’s second supermarket at Loughton, which 
opened to much fanfare in 1962, illustrates the challenges faced in opening innovative 
new supermarket stores. The store was extremely large by standards of the day, with 
the 28 165 sq ft site providing 15 250 sq feet of selling space.54 The new store, it was 
reported, was expected to draw trade from a thickly populated area between 
Leytonstone in the South and Harlow in the North, with the Debden housing estate 
being a short bus ride away.55 However, within a year serious concerns were being 
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raised about the performance of the store. With sales reportedly below those needed 
for profitability, executives began to view the store as being too large for its 
‘comparatively thinly surrounding population’.56 As a consequence plans were made 
for the alternative use of 40 per cent of the store’s space for heavy furnishing goods 
and for a pharmacy to be brought in, both elements under separate control from the 
supermarket.57 The store was reported as being profitable for the first time in the 
society’s balance sheet for the year ending January 1966.58  
“Shopping Environment and Service” is the second offering element for 
discussion. Remarking upon the opening of the LCS’s first self-service store in 1942, 
the then food trades manager recalled that the society was keen to find out four things: 
would the customer pick up their own goods; could the LCS get higher through put 
from the staff; was it possible to use less experienced assistants; and could pilfering 
be guarded against?59 By the 1960s the retail management challenges of self-service 
trading in supermarkets were more substantial as firms competed to offer the shopper 
more innovations. A research report by J. Walter Thompson noted of the “housewife” 
on a shopping trip ‘Inside the supermarket she is in a new and exciting, although to 
some people a confusing, atmosphere. She may shop to music or relayed sales 
messages; and she is confronted with new products, daily bargains, unusual form and 
colour combinations in packaging and increasingly sophisticated methods of 
display.’60 In this environment of product and service innovation and spectacle even 
the newly converted self-service outlets of the LCS were the subject of some critical 
scrutiny.    
BBDO, for example, reported that among co-operative members and non-
members alike more thought the society’s stores ‘less up to date’ than competitors’ 
stores than those considering ‘them more up to date’. This, it was suggested, may 
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have reflected the view that the co-operative movement as a whole had an old 
fashioned ‘cloth cap’ look to it.61 Whatever the cause this perception was problematic 
because shopping environment and service were obviously important to shoppers in 
their choice of store. The society’s newer self service stores were generally considered 
an improvement over its more traditional counter service outlets, but some shoppers 
thought they compared poorly to the competitors’ large supermarkets, being less 
roomy and less well organised. As one non LCS member is reported as saying of their 
self-service stores ‘As they’re not as big as the supermarkets they don’t seem to carry 
much stock – or they give that impression as they’re smaller.’ Another stated 
‘supermarkets are much better because they’re more roomy.’62 Similar shopper 
sentiments were aired when the contest for managerial control of the LCS made the 
national media in 1963. In a script for the BBC’s Panorama television programme 
one shopper is quoted ‘well, I don’t know in what way, they just don’t compare with 
other shops, with the supermarkets, they’re just not quite so attractive to go into as the 
supermarkets.’63 However, for some shoppers the private multiples’ supermarkets 
were not the pinnacle to aim for. As one occasional shopper at the LCS’s new self-
service outlets reported to BBDO ‘The local one is very nice. It’s well laid out, easy 
to find things. It’s less garish than other supermarkets. It doesn’t push itself to the 
same extent. The co-op always has dignity.’64  
The LCS first supermarket proper opened on August 19th 1962 at Becontree. 
Understandably the society made much of its new 3 000 square foot supermarket. But 
the reviewer from the trade press Grocers’ Gazette was far from overawed by the new 
development. The store, it was argued, was comparatively small and it was noted that 
the LCS already had larger food halls in operation. Aisles were criticised as being too 
narrow, leading to congestion, and the departmental layout was not typical of the 
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latest design. Commenting on advertisement features placed in local press 
supplements by the society, the author for the Gazette could find little evidence to 
support claims of this development being the result of an ‘adventurous LCS…’ or 
representing  ‘shopping revolutions’.65 It was the LCS’s opening of what was reported 
to be the capital’s largest supermarket at Loughton three months later that signalled 
their ambition to use the modern format to its fullest potential. Here reviews were 
more positive, seemingly impressed by its 150 foot covered frontage and sheer scale, 
and noting innovations in gondola arrangement and the attempt to present an ‘open 
market atmosphere’.66 Complimentary reports suggested that having parked the pram 
at the large pram park, the shopper could push her two tier trolley around the vast 
store to the sound of piped music, observing the deep price cuts that abound and all 
the while confident that the store has a commissionaire to ‘keep an eye on junior’.67  
 We now turn to the issue of “Product Assortment”; the third of Goldman’s 
offering components. As the Financial Times remarked, ‘While the supermarkets are 
busily working to acquire the knowledge [of how to sell non-food items], the Co-ops 
individually possess long experience over the whole range of consumer goods’.68 This 
was certainly true. Societies also enjoyed the supply chain infrastructure provided by 
the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS). While the full potential of the 
relationship between the movement’s production, wholesale and retail parts was far 
from realised69, co-operatives were notionally in a strong position to meet the 
increasingly wide assortment of products being offered in the newest and largest of its 
rivals’ supermarkets.  
The reality was a mixed affair. In a review of supermarket retailing across the 
movement in 1962 the Co-operative News remarked on the continued heavy reliance 
on trade in grocery, cigarettes and tobacco, noting that about one third of its 
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supermarkets did not yet sell non-food. Stores with an average of 4 000 sq feet 
typically had about 60 per cent of their floor area devoted to grocery goods alone. In 
smaller self-service outlets the figure rose to 70 per cent.70 The absence of non-food in 
many “supermarkets” sat uncomfortably with much modern practice and with the 
CWS’s view of what a modern supermarket should look like. In a letter sent to 
societies in early 1961 it had explained that ‘In light of contemporary trends the CWS 
Board feels that typical co-operative supermarket should have a minimum sales area 
of 4000 sq ft and sell groceries, provisions, fresh fruit, vegetables fresh meats, a 
selected range of household requisites and other dry goods.’ 71 
The LCS’s purpose-designed supermarkets seemingly met many of the 
criteria. The opening of the Becontree store revealed a selection of towels, toasters, 
electric fires, toys, china and glass for sale. Its manager was keen to boast that as a 
result of the society’s dry goods department he could get some non-food goods he 
wanted into store within 24 hours.72 The society’s third supermarket, opened in 
Walthamstow in September 1963, was arranged on an approximately 90/10 spilt (food 
to non-food) with non-foods being focussed around easily carried clothing items.73 
The opening of the Loughton supermarket took the LCS’s attempts to combine food 
and non-food trading under one supermarket roof to another level. Approximately half 
of the 15 000 sq ft trading hall was devoted to foodstuffs and the remainder given 
over to non-foods.74 In addition to the food department with large deep freeze and 
delicatessen sections, advertisements for the store remarked on its extensive range of 
non-food goods including a fashion department, linen and kitchenware, soft 
furnishings, electrical goods, health and beauty, record bar and gifts and toys.75 Yet it 
is also instructive to consider the subsequent sales performance of the various 
supermarket departments. Grocery unsurprisingly dominated sales in all three 
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supermarkets, but the performance reported for “dry goods” was at best modest. In the 
two smaller supermarkets at Becontree and Walthamstow dry goods were typically far 
outsold in value by tobacco products.76 
Like other co-operative societies the LCS pursued a strategy of developing 
larger self-service food halls, both stand alone and within its department stores.77 
Combining two or more of the main food trades, the society’s food halls provided the 
shopper with a wider product assortment than many of its smaller self-service grocery 
outlets. Yet the combination of previously separate food trades units posed 
merchandising and other problems. During a period of accelerated conversions in 
1962 a deputation of the society’s fruit and vegetable managers met with the Food 
Trades Manager to raise concerns over the integration of previously separate units 
into food halls. Included among these were what they considered the frequent lack of 
adequate product preparation space, shoppers’ lack of acceptance of pre-packaged 
products that were crucial to self-service operations and their dislike of having ‘to 
wander around the rest of the Food Hall’ to reach the exit, and the high sales targets 
placed on the newly integrated units. The deputation suggested that it was perhaps 
better if only the unprofitable fruit and vegetable operations be combined into food 
halls. Acknowledging some of the difficulties and limitations in current hall design, 
the society’s Food Trades Manager was nonetheless driven to remark upon the 
apparent “departmentalism” he perceived in some of the discussions.78  
Typical early food halls lacked a significant non-food component. 
Consequently the food hall concept seemed increasingly moribund as the full 
supermarket format evolved among competitors and the LCS sought to introduce an 
increasing range of non-foods into the halls.79 By 1963 the society was forced to 
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accept the far greater popular appeal of the term “supermarket”, and chose to adopt it 
for all stores over 2 000 sq feet and to promote them to the public as such.80  
The fourth offering component “Price” represented an increasingly important 
element of the supermarket. Surveys of shoppers’ attitudes to the supermarket 
undertaken during the early 1960s stressed the advantages they offered in terms of 
providing a one stop shop, a hygienic shopping environment and a time saving 
shopping experience.81 Lower prices in supermarkets were less strongly reported as a 
particular advantage, perhaps in part due to interviewees wishing to provide socially 
desirable answers. Only 13 per cent of J. Walter Thompson’s survey of almost 1400 
women shoppers reported lower prices as a particular advantage of the supermarket 
format.82 One woman’s response was ‘You have to watch prices, though. In the 
supermarket they’re not always cut-price’.83  
          This was certainly true in some cases, but price competition had increasingly 
become a part of the supermarket’s impact. Resale Price Maintenance had virtually 
broken down in grocery by 1959, and its demise had started somewhat earlier in the 
highly competitive London market.84 In 1958 the LCS had seen the need to launch a 
“price-attraction” policy, selling fast moving grocery products below normal prices in 
response to the price cutting of the supermarkets.85 However, sustaining this price 
competition was problematic due to the greater costs incurred by the LCS’s food retail 
operations. Whilst the LCS believed that their supermarket rivals operated on costs of 
2s 6d in the £ or less, comparable figures for the LCS were reported as 3s 2d 
(grocery), 4s 6d (butchery) and 4s 10d (fruit and vegetables).86  
BBDO’s research findings pointed to significant weaknesses in consumer’s 
reaction to the LCS offer on price. Surveying both members and non-members the 
report found that the LCS was perceived by the vast majority to be similar or higher in 
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price to rival multiples.  Members and non members alike thought that the private 
multiples offered the lowest prices, with Sainsbury, Victor Value and Tesco 
frequently mentioned as being the cheapest for groceries.87 BBDO reported that 60 
per cent of the more than 530 members questioned claimed to use another (non LCS) 
store most often for their groceries.88  
           Following a change of management control of the LCS in 1962, the result of 
the bitter struggle between the 1960 Campaign Committee and the vanquished 
LCMO, the society set about plans to compete better against the private multiples, 
particularly the supermarket retailers.89 Conspicuous among these was the adoption of 
an aggressive and flexible pricing policy, with regional and area co-ordinators 
empowered to make price cuts and selected discounts to meet the competition of 
private multiples in their area on a shop by shop basis.90 In October 1962 the society 
launched an “instant dividend” at its self-service stores and a guaranteed 6d dividend 
at other shops.91 However, the instant dividend was restricted to larger self-service 
stores by 1963.92 Its reduction and ultimate demise came amid considerable acrimony 
between rival groups on the society’s management board, including contested 
allegations as to members’ commitment to the on-going modernisation of the retail 
trades and dispute over the society’s actual trading performance.93  
      It was into this highly price competitive London market that the LCS 
opened its first supermarkets, competing against large private multiples able to sustain 
low margin trading. The society sought to heavily promote the price competitiveness 
of each of its supermarkets of course. Its paper Citizen stressed that the Loughton 
supermarket was about providing value for shoppers and noted the deep price cuts 
available on a number of lines.94 Similarly, in an allusion to the street markets 
operating close to the Walthamstow supermarket, the supermarket’s manager stressed 
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to readers of the local press that shoppers at his store could enjoy hygienic food 
retailing together with ‘barrow boy prices’ without the discomfort of street trading.95 
Yet this need for heavy discounting and price competition provides some explanation 
for the fact that all of the LCS supermarkets recorded net losses during their initial 
years of trading. As the society’s Chief Accountant noted in his report for the year 
ending 1964, despite rising sales ‘to date …the supermarket venture has been a 
complete failure; the trade achieved has been inadequate in view of the low gross 
profit rate, the wage cost and the high overheads following the heavy capital cost’.96 
Yet the report went on to suggest that the LCS was not alone in finding difficulties 
with supermarket profitability in 1963 and argued that across the trade there was 
evidence of the impact of ‘low-price selling’ on supermarket profitability. Based on 
this, a somewhat brighter outlook of reduced loss-leading activities and gently upward 
margins was forecast for the middle years of the 1960s.  
The final offering component for consideration is “Marketing and Promotion”. 
In an attempt to promote a new image and the aggressive pricing policies of the LCS,  
BBDO’s public relations firm PDA was engaged to handle a major LCS advertising 
and publicity campaign.97 Their UK head concluded ‘We’ll go out and knock spots of 
John Cohen and his supermarket chain.’98 Television and press advertisements were 
designed to push the new message of the LCS under the general slogan ‘Buy better for 
less at the LCS’. An advertisement in the Evening Standard proclaimed ‘Check this 
list carefully. It shows every London housewife how much she saves … at LCS self-
service shops. Our computers work it out at 10.7208%’.99 As we have seen, this was 
supported by promotion of the price competitiveness of each of the society’s 
supermarkets at the time of their opening.  
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Among other store outputs emphasis was placed on the convenience of having 
food and non-food items under one roof in the supermarket. This was intended to 
reflect emerging evidence that women food shoppers favoured the supermarket as it 
could offer ‘all you want in one shop’.100 Unsurprisingly the new, very large 
supermarket at Loughton was strongly promoted as a ‘shopping centre for the whole 
family’.101 The Co-operative News announced ‘It’s everything for everybody in 
London’s giant supermarket’.102 Yet, self-service shopping and the supermarket 
format provided challenges as well as opportunities to the food shopper during the 
1960s. For housewives seeking to meet their responsibilities for proficient shopping 
switching to these new formats could create anxiety and required the nurturing of new 
skills.103 Retailers sought to adopt the leitmotiv “modern” to reassure consumers. The 
LCS was no different in this regard. For example, emphasis was placed on the theme 
of modernity in promotional literature for the opening of the Stratford Food Hall in 
spring 1962.104 Similarly, press supplements to advertise the new Becontree 
supermarket reportedly spoke of ‘[the] supermarket of the future…’ and of ‘Advanced 
American ideas…’105 The opening of the large Loughton supermarket later in the 
same year was promoted with clear reference to one particular theme of the early 
1960s. One advertisement announced ‘The LCS bring space-age shopping to 
Loughton’.106  
 
 
‘Know-How’ (internal) elements of the supermarket format  
 
Know-how consists of “Retail Technology” and “Retail Culture” elements. In terms 
of retail technology, which is discussed first, attention is focussed upon the important 
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issue of supply chain systems. The accelerated development of low margin, high 
turnover retailing through larger self-service stores and supermarkets placed increased 
pressure on supply chain systems and necessitated improvements in stock handling. 
The financial press drew broad comparisons between the private multiples, lauded for 
their ‘computer controlled stock systems and expert management’ and the systems 
and processes of non-modernising co-operative societies.107 However, manufacturers 
maintained a strong position in the distribution chain and played an increasingly 
important role through rising direct to store delivery. Many major retailers’ 
distributions systems were in need of modernization.108 J. Sainsbury was reported to 
openly acknowledge the dated nature of its distribution infrastructure compared to that 
of its shops.109 The company set about investing in new distribution centres during the 
early 1960s; the first opened in Basingstoke, Hampshire in 1964. 
 It was against this backdrop that in 1963 the Board of the CWS approached 
societies about the introduction of its plan for regional distribution centres aimed to 
introduce the “newest technologies” to the distribution system and reduce the costly 
duplication of co-operative society warehouse infrastructure.110 The LCS was critical 
of what it saw as a delay by the CWS in coming to terms with the need for revised 
warehouse and distribution systems. Instead it suggested that the society should 
proceed with its own warehouse project,111 the significance of supply chain 
modernisation having been highlighted in an internal grocery department enquiry of 
1963. This enquiry reported that the society’s warehousing capacity was out of 
proportion with the demands placed upon it and set down plans to deal with this.112 
Falling departmental sales and rising direct to store delivery from private 
manufacturers meant that the society’s warehouses handled only 50 per cent of the 
society’s retail trade.113 In relation to their organisation the report continued ‘(the) 
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present warehouse arrangements are not designed as a slave to the shops’ or laid out 
with regard to the general need of the branches. As a consequence, the stock holding 
areas of many branches were reported to be congested and inadequate for the 
increased amount of pre-packaging occurring in store.   
 The poorly organised nature of the warehouses in relation to shop needs was 
particularly problematic as self-service retailing necessitated the pre-packaging of 
most foodstuffs. Whilst non-perishable foods came to the stores pre-packaged from 
manufacturers and wholesalers, many perishables continued to be packaged in store 
and in the case of fresh meat retailing this necessitated investment in specialised 
cutting and preparation rooms.114 Management of the LCS grocery department 
considered that the society should be mirroring sector trends toward more pre-
packaging taking place in central warehouses, but special provision was made in its 
new supermarkets for extensive food preparation at the store. Whilst the trading area 
of the society’s first purpose-developed supermarket at Becontree was comparatively 
small at only 3 000 square feet, the store nonetheless provided an almost similar 
amount of above-store warehousing space and a purpose-designed ground level 
packaging room.115 Similarly, the later Walthamstow supermarket had a sales area of 
4 700 square feet supported by a further 2 300 square feet of storage, preparation and 
refrigeration space.116 The much larger Loughton supermarket had far more extensive 
food preparation and pre-packaging areas, starting with its integrated butchery cutting 
room that customers of its meat department could observe directly from the trading 
floor.117 Behind this lay almost 6500 sq ft of warehousing and a 2650 sq feet loading 
bay providing a ‘streamlined… supply operation.’118 
 Finally we consider “Retail Culture”, the second main know-how component 
of the retail format. Discussions of the distinctive characteristics of the co-operative’s 
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management structure and of the tensions between the movement’s commercial and 
ideological interests are well versed in recent literature.119 Such tensions came to the 
fore in the electoral battles for control of the LCS management committee during the 
early 1960s. Complicated by deep political divisions, the electoral contests resulted in 
serious infighting between rival management lobbies, ultimately leading to legal 
action. The political foundations of these contests are not the focus of this section. 
Nonetheless their effects should not be underestimated in terms of their ability to 
drawing focus away from the pressing needs for improved retail management.   
Rapid growth of the private multiples’ share of the food market focussed 
commentator attention on the differences in structure and organisational culture 
between them and the co-operative societies. The issue was widely aired. Alongside 
inflammatory press descriptions of ‘pig-headed committees that just talk, talk, talk 
while the superstores steal their trade…’120 came rather more considered assessments 
of the deficiencies of management in many co-operative societies in comparison to 
that of the multiples.121 
 The LCS’s retail management structure increasingly came under attack from 
‘modernisers’ from within and without. BBDO considered that to successfully 
rejuvenate the food trades required a change of management. Indeed it asserted that 
poor management was the main problem of the LCS’s food business; with new 
management needed that is ‘good enough to run a £30m business…’122 BBDO 
concluded further that such management needed the input of outside management 
counselling. Similarly, in a notorious attack on the traditional management structure 
of the LCS following a society visit to the Konsum co-operative in Stockholm, LCS 
President Stonehouse remarked in the pages of The Grocer ‘due to historic 
circumstances, the LCS control structure has grown into a rather complex bureaucracy 
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which tends to centralise detailed trading decisions, blunt initiative in the executive 
ranks and delay action’. He continued, ‘In practice many officials prefer to shelter 
behind committees rather than taking personal responsibility. The system encourages 
timidity and inaction…’ 123 Such comments need to be read in the context of the on-
going bitter dispute and division among members of the LCS management board. 
Nevertheless, the challenge of combining co-operative business efficiency with the 
ethos of democratic control was the subject of more wide ranging enquiry at the 
time.124  
Planning for the development of supermarket trading itself required revisions 
to management structures, with the existing sub-committee organisation considered 
impractical for their management. Accordingly, the society’s Chief Officer and 
Secretary set down plans for a “Supermarket Division”. Merchandise sold in the 
supermarkets would be obtained through the existing buying organisation of the food, 
dry goods and pharmacy departments but the division would operate independent of 
these, recruiting its own staff and organising its own promotion and selling. It was 
agreed that during the early phases of supermarket development the Assistant Chief 
Officer and Secretary would have control and responsibility for these operations, thus 
avoiding the need for the various sub-committees to be continuously consulted as the 
business progressed.125  
The possibility for tension between commercial and ideological interests could 
also be manifest in the reactions of members and employees to the modernisation of 
retailing through the adoption of large self-service units and supermarkets.126 For 
some members of the movement the closure of smaller, economically inefficient yet 
convenient society branches in local neighbourhoods in order to save costs, or to 
make way for a proposed supermarket, was emblematic of the dangers of ill-managed 
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change and sat uncomfortably with their interpretation of the movement’s purpose.127 
The closure of the LCS branch in Walthamstow, nearby its recently opened 
supermarket, saw a petition of protest from the Walthamstow Women’s Guild to the 
Co-operative Union demanding ‘… that it is kept open as a service to the members 
especially the old and loyal ones’.128 The issue of shop closures was also raised in the 
bitter row among members of the management committee. Stiffened resistance to 
Stonehouse’s presidency reportedly led one member of the management committee to 
draw parallels with the impact of Beeching on the railways and to argue that the 
society should not continue closing branches without considering the social 
consequences.129 The retailing practices employed in the society’s supermarkets were 
also the subject of debate and disappointment for some members and their 
representatives. Eleven months after the opening of the Loughton supermarket LCS 
officials met with a deputation from Debden Loughton Co-operative Party to discuss 
their concerns over the trading methods at the store. These included worries that the 
range of CWS goods sold was too small, a related objection to the space given over to 
promotion of private manufactured products and unhappiness that non-members 
shopping at the store enjoyed the same benefits as members.130 
Unsurprisingly there were diverse opinions across the movement, as well as 
within societies, as to the means by which to best meet the challenges posed by the 
private multiples’ supermarkets. The proposals of the LCS to compete through an 
instant dividend drew a rather critical consideration in the official journal of the co-
operative movement Co-operative News. Such a policy, it was argued, diluted the 
distinctive features of the co-operative and reduced its social purpose thus rendering it 
no different than any private multiple.131 As Fulop noted, the dividend had an 
emotional hold over co-operators at this time, its primacy remaining official co-
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operative policy.132 The LCS’s Stonehouse argued that the co-operative movement as 
a whole continued to pay insufficient attention to new methods in retailing despite 
attempts to revise management structures of the Co-operative Union. He concluded, 
‘We have not studied enough nor applied sufficiently the new techniques in retailing 
including supplier relations, supermarket trading, non-food trading in supermarkets 
and so on.’133 When members of the LCS hosted a conference “The Way Forward in 
Retail Trading” its organiser Stonehouse claimed he had ‘no wish to interfere with 
anything that is being done by the Union and its committees but it is very important 
that societies should be able to meet and discuss problems that are with us all the time 
and are developing week by week without waiting for Congress to come along.’134 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The late 1950s and early 1960s were clearly a time of great challenge and difficulty 
for the LCS’s food retailing operations. The growing emphasis on supermarket 
development by the private multiples trading in the London area put considerable 
pressure on the society’s place as a major player in the capital’s food retail market. 
These supermarket retailers were working on downwardly revised margins and costs 
in an environment of intensified competition for trade and labour. It was into this 
arena that the LCS embarked upon its development of supermarket retailing 
operations. The study offers us an insight into a period of learning for the society 
about the supermarket format and its potential. Much of this learning was forced upon 
the LCS. From the late 1950s onwards the society launched numerous price reduction 
schemes designed to meet the threat posed by the multiples’ supermarkets as it 
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eventually hurried to develop its own such outlets. By 1963 the society made the 
fundamental decision to use the term “supermarket” for all of its larger stores in an 
attempt to attract customers desirous of the outputs they perceived such new store 
types could offer.  
 Another manifestation of this period of learning about the supermarket 
innovation is the diversity of large self-service stores initially operated by the society. 
The earliest experiences of such operations came through the society’s food halls. As 
non-foods were introduced into these halls the larger of these became effectively 
supermarkets, being very much comparable to the society’s two smaller, purpose-
developed supermarkets. Turning to the supermarkets, in store size and offer the 
contrast between the society’s first supermarket opened at Becontree and its second at 
Loughton was marked. Trade press reviews portrayed Becontree as a small, 
unexceptional supermarket and one that failed to live up to the society’s boasts of 
‘shopping revolutions’. The Loughton store opened only three months later revealed 
the real ambitions of the LCS to benefit from the new large format approach. The 
history of supermarket development was not characterised by the roll out of a 
homogenous store type; instead it was a “messy” process including much trial and 
error. Nonetheless, the significance going forward of developing larger supermarkets 
was clear.135  
The use of a detailed conceptualisation of the format incorporating offering 
and know-how components allows for a more comprehensive consideration of the 
LCS management’s engagement with the supermarket format. It can also provide 
some explanation for variations between the supermarket operations of private 
multiples, independents and co-operative societies. The main focus here has been on 
the co-operative society aspect. In relation to the offering components, it is clear that 
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the development of supermarkets provided new challenges in terms of the planning of 
store locations, the design of store environments and their provision of service, 
pricing strategy and wider marketing and promotion. In each of these domains 
supermarket operations required changes from the practices adopted by the LCS for 
both counter-service operations and more recently established smaller self-service 
stores.  
Know-how components of the format were more hidden to the customer but 
were increasingly fundamental to the successful operation of supermarkets. In relation 
to systems and procedures, this paper has placed emphasis on the pressures on supply 
chain systems resulting from the development of larger, higher turnover stores. A 
particular requirement during the study period was for more extensive food storage 
and preparation areas. The paper has also revealed the significance of an appreciation 
of the “retail culture” of the co-operative movement as a whole, and the LCS in 
particular, to our understanding of the supermarket developments that occurred. The 
often uneasy combination of enterprise and social goals that characterise the 
movement was further uncovered by the challenges of retail modernisation during the 
study period. The desire to maintain democratic principles of control proved very 
problematic as practiced by the LCS during the study period. Of course the 
management boards of many private multiples were themselves the source of 
unproductive friction, but the in-fighting between rival management groups at the 
LCS appears singularly bitter and certainly represented a distraction from the pressing 
business at hand. The movement’s practices and norms in the distribution of capital, 
both imposed and self-imposed, meant it faced particular difficulties in financing the 
heavily capital intensive new store developments required. When the new stores were 
opened the LCS, like other societies, could face criticism and dissatisfaction from 
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employees and shopper members alike.  Again there is no suggestion that private 
multiples were immune from such criticism, but the particular nature of the 
cooperative movement and its effective ownership by members meant that it drove 
further to the heart of retail societies deliberations on how to best meet the diverse 
demands placed upon them going forward. 
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